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Abstract
This paper analyses the policy implications of licensing between producers of diﬀer-
entiated goods. We consider and compare two-part tariﬀ, ﬁxed fee, royalty and collusive
licensing contracts. Under the optimal licensing policy, there will be no technology trans-
fers if the innovation size is suﬃciently small and degree of product diﬀerentiation is
suﬃciently low. On the other hand, licensing deals that involve drastic innovations are
always socially desirable. In the limit, as product diﬀerentiation converges to zero, it
becomes socially desirable to transfer drastic innovations only. The range of innovation
sizes that is socially optimal to transfer increases as product diﬀerentiation increases.
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n.erkal@unimelb.edu.au.II n t r o d u c t i o n
In many industries, licensing plays an important role in decisions regarding the develop-
ment and commercialization of innovations.1 The goal of this paper is to analyze the policy
implications of licensing arrangements between competing ﬁrms. In spite of the fact that
innovators may gain signiﬁcant market power, it is common for technology transfer deals to
take place between competitors. In such cases, licensing of intellectual property raises com-
plex antitrust issues. On the one hand, the diﬀusion of new technologies potentially increases
the beneﬁts consumers can obtain from the use of those innovations. On the other hand, the
licensing arrangements ﬁrms use to exchange their technologies may have anticompetitive
and welfare-reducing consequences. Thus, while patent licensing plays an important role in
the dissemination of innovations within an industry, it is necessary to compare the private
and social incentives to license.
We consider licensing of cost-reducing innovations between ﬁrms producing in a diﬀeren-
tiated duopoly. If the ﬁrms are horizontal competitors, the licensor faces a trade-oﬀ between
increased rivalry and increased licensing revenues while making its licensing decision. We
explore how restrictive a licensing policy the government should have in diﬀerent types of
industries and whether there are cases when it is socially optimal not to have any technology
transfers. In addition, we determine whether it may be socially desirable to allow collusive
licensing agreements where ﬁrms ﬁxp r i c e s .
Antitrust authorities in diﬀerent countries have recently started to take actions to deter-
mine how they will deal with the antitrust implications of licensing arrangements. In the
United States, the “Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property” issued
jointly by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in
1995 describe generally how the agencies will handle various forms of licensing deals that
may contain anticompetitive provisions.2 As pointed out in the Guidelines, such anticompet-
itive provisions are especially worrisome when the technology transfer takes place between
1Degnan (1999) reports that royalties and fees collected by U.S. corporations exceeded $136 billion in 1996.
Anand and Khanna (2000) document that licensing accounted for 38% of all strategic alliances in the chemical
industry, 18% of all strategic alliances in the computer industry, and 24% of all strategic alliances in the
electronics industry between 1990 and 1993. A study by Grindley and Teece (1997) documents that major
ﬁrms in high-technology industries, such as AT&T, IBM, Texas Instruments, and Hewlett-Packard, regard the
use of licensing and cross-licensing as an important part of their business strategies. Arora and Fosfuri (1998),
and Grindley and Nickerson (1996) discuss the extensive use of licensing in the chemical industry.
2Gilbert and Shapiro (1997) contains a discussion of the history of antitrust enforcement in the licensing
of intellectual property.
1horizontal competitors. The general approach stated in the Guidelines is that such provi-
sions will not be challenged as long as they are “necessary to achieve procompetitive beneﬁts
that outweigh... [the] anticompetitive eﬀects (p. 12).” Moreover, it is stated that certain
kinds of licensing restraints, such as naked price ﬁxing, are so "plainly anticompetitive" that
they should be treated as unlawful "without an elaborate inquiry into the restraints’ likely
competitive eﬀect (p. 16)."
In contrast, we ﬁnd that there may be cases when price ﬁxing is socially preferable to
other types of licensing contracts and to no licensing. This is true both in case of drastic and
nondrastic innovations. Our analysis is also signiﬁcant in the light of recent policy considera-
tions in Australia regarding the antitrust treatment of licensing arrangements. In Australia,
Part IV of the Trade Practices Act 1974, administered by the Australian Competition and
Consumer Commission (ACCC), deals with anti-competitive practices. Currently, licensing
arrangements of the kind considered in this paper are exempt from the Act.3 However, the
government has recently decided to expose terms and conditions of licensing arrangements to
Part IV of the Act to a greater extent. Speciﬁcally, the Final Report of the Intellectual Prop-
erty and Competition Review Committee, submitted in September 2000, recommends that
"the exemption ... be amended to remove protection for price and quantity restrictions and
for horizontal agreements."4 As a response to the Final Report, the ACCC is currently in the
process of coming up with some guidelines regarding its treatment of licensing arrangements.
To analyze the policy implications of licensing arrangements, we consider industries where
ﬁrms predominantly use royalty, ﬁxed fee or two-part tariﬀ licensing contracts. As shown in
Rockett (1990b), in industries where imitation is not costly and is likely to take place, ﬁrms
may prefer to use ﬁxed fee licensing contracts only.5,6 On the other hand, Gallini and Wright
(1990), Beggs (1992), Macho-Stadler et al. (1996), and Choi (2001) show that the existence
of asymmetric information may cause the ﬁrms to prefer royalty payments.7,8 We assume
3This is stated in s. 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act.
4See p. 202 of the Final Report available at http://www.ipcr.gov.au/.
5Rockett (1990) assumes that the ﬁxed fee is paid up front. The licensees may have incentives to imitate
the technology to avoid making royalty payments if imitation is technologically feasible and not too costly.
This may cause the licensor to put much more weight on ﬁxed fees than on royalties.
6High monitoring costs may be another reason for the use of ﬁxed fee licensing contracts only.
7Gallini and Wright (1990) and Beggs (1992) consider cases when either the licensor or the licensee has
more information about the value of the innovation. In their models, royalties may be used as a signalling
device by the more knowledgeable party. In Choi (2001), royalty payments may be used to encourage the
licensor to transfer a suﬃcient amount of information in an environment of incomplete contracts.
8Examining a sample of international licensing contracts signed by Spanish ﬁrms in 1991, Macho-Stadler et
al. (1996) state that most of the contracts were based on either ﬁxed fees or royalty payments only. According
to a survey done among 150 U.S. corporations, Rostoker (1984) states that 46% of the ﬁrms surveyed used
2that if collusive licensing deals are allowed by the antitrust authorities, the ﬁrms will always
prefer them over the other types of licensing deals.
While a ﬁxed fee has no eﬀect on the behavior of the licensee, a royalty aﬀects the
licensee’s output choice since it increases the (eﬀective) marginal cost of production. As
a result, royalties can act as a facilitating device. We ﬁnd that if the licensing agreement
includes a royalty rate only, collusive licensing may be more attractive than royalty licensing
in two ways. First, a large set of technology transfers that are socially desirable under royalty
licensing result in even a higher welfare increase under collusive licensing. That is, allowing
the ﬁrms to have a direct control over each other’s prices through collusive licensing may
result in a higher welfare level than allowing the licensor to have an indirect control over the
price of the rival ﬁrm through licensing with a royalty. Second, some technology transfers
that may not be socially desirable under royalty licensing become socially desirable if the
ﬁrms use a collusive licensing deal.
In general, the results on optimal licensing policy reveal that for suﬃciently low degrees
of product diﬀerentiation and suﬃciently small innovations, it is socially optimal to have
no technology transfers at all. This is because licensing deals between producers of close
substitutes that involve suﬃciently small (nondrastic) innovations are socially desirable if
and only if the ﬁrms use ﬁxed fee licensing. However, the ﬁrms do not ﬁnd it optimal to use
ﬁxed fee licensing for suﬃciently high innovation sizes and low degrees of diﬀerentiation.
Under the optimal licensing policy, the range of innovation sizes that is socially desirable to
transfer decreases as the degree of product diﬀerentiation decreases. In the limit, as the degree
of product diﬀerentiation converges to zero, it is optimal to transfer drastic innovations only.
In fact, if the innovation is drastic, it is always socially desirable to encourage its transfer.
In industries where ﬁrms choose to do royalty licensing only, it is socially preferable to have
such transfers by means of collusive licensing deals. That is, welfare under collusive licensing
is higher than welfare under royalty licensing which is higher than welfare under no licensing.
In industries where ﬁxed fee licensing is preferred, it is socially optimal to allow collusive
licensing deals for drastic innovations between producers of close substitutes, which would
otherwise choose not to have any technology transfers.
There exists a vast theoretical literature exploring the reasons, types, and consequences of
technology licensing. Kamien (1992) contains a survey. The papers in this literature can be
grouped into two depending on whether they assume the licensor and the potential licensees
two-part-tariﬀ licensing, 39% used royalty licensing, and 13% used ﬁxed-fee licensing.
3operate in diﬀerent markets or in the same market.9 Among the papers in the second group,
Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Marjit (1990) consider ﬁxed fee licensing between Cournot
duopolists producing homogenous products and conclude that major innovations will not be
licensed. Katz and Shapiro (1985) also show that the social incentives to license exceed the
private ones. Our analysis shows that this result holds only in industries characterized by high
rates of imitation where the ﬁrms prefer to do ﬁxed fee licensing only. Rockett (1990b) shows
that whether royalty or ﬁxed fee licensing will be used depends on the likelihood of imitation.
Wang (1998 and 2002), and Wang and Yang (1999) show that royalty licensing may be more
proﬁtable than ﬁxed fee licensing in a Cournot and Bertrand duopoly respectively. Kamien
and Tauman (2002) extend Wang (1998) to the case of a Cournot oligopoly. Finally, in a
recent paper, Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) show that licensing deals between producers
of diﬀerentiated products may be welfare-reducing.10
Among the papers that analyze the antitrust implications of licensing between rival ﬁrms,
Shapiro (1985) and Lin (1996) discuss how two-part tariﬀ and ﬁxed fee licensing contracts can
be designed to achieve collusion. Gallini (1984), Rockett (1990), Eswaran (1994), and Hollis
(2002) show how ﬁrms can shape the competition they face by strategically choosing the types
of ﬁrms they license their technology to. Recently, Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2003) analyze
when licensing may be welfare-superior to a merger. Although their treatment of mergers
is similar to our treatment of collusive licensing deals, this paper diﬀers by having a more
general analysis of optimal licensing policy. We discuss when it is socially optimal to have
the diﬀerent types of licensing contracts and what types of innovations are socially optimal
to transfer. Our results diﬀer by showing how restrictive a licensing policy the government
should have in diﬀerent types of industries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides an outline of the model. In Section
III, we start the analysis by ﬁnding the proﬁt levels under no licensing. Section IV contains
an analysis of ﬁrms’ private incentives to license. For expositional ease, we ﬁrst consider the
special cases of royalty and ﬁxed fee licensing before turning to the general case of two-part
tariﬀ licensing. In this section, we also present the outcome under collusive licensing. The
main results of the paper regarding optimal licensing policy are in Section V. Section VI
9For the ﬁrst group of papers, see, for example, Katz and Shapiro (1986), Kamien and Tauman (1986),
Kamien, Oren and Tauman (1992), and Muto (1993). See Poddar and Sinha (2004) for a comparison of the
optimal licensing strategies of an insider and an outsider licensor.
10All of the papers we refer to here focus on licensing deals between actual competitors. See Gallini (1984),
Shepard (1987), Rockett (1990a) and Arora and Fosfuri (2003) for an analysis of licensing deals between
incumbents and potential competitors.
4concludes and indicates directions for future research. All proofs are in the Appendix.
II Model
There are two ﬁrms, ﬁrm i and ﬁrm j, each producing a diﬀerentiated good. The ﬁrms have
constant marginal costs of production, ci and cj.F i r m i is the patentholder for a process
technology that enables it to have a lower marginal cost than ﬁrm j.11 Letting ε represent
t h es i z eo ft h ei n n o v a t i o n ,w eh a v ecj = ci +ε.F i r mi can license the technology to ﬁrm j in
return for a payment, in which case both ﬁrms face a marginal cost of ci.
Following Singh and Vives (1984), we consider the following diﬀerentiated duopoly model.12
There is a continuum of consumers of the same type with a utility function that is separable in
income. The representative consumer maximizes U (qi,q j)−piqi−pjqj,w h e r epi and qi stand
for the price and output level of ﬁrm i respectively. U (qi,q j) is assumed to be quadratic,
strictly concave in qi and qj, and symmetric with respect to qi and qj.I ti sd e ﬁned as
U (qi,q j)=a(qi + qj) −
¡
q2




where a>0 and 1− θ>0. The parameter θ expresses the degree of product diﬀerentiation.
The goods are substitutes, independent, or complements according to whether θ>0, θ =0 ,
or θ<0. Given this utility function, the direct demand functions are
qi =
a(1 − θ) − pi + θpj ¡
1 − θ2¢ ; qj =
a(1 − θ) − pj + θpi ¡
1 − θ2¢ .( 2 )
These demand functions are downward-sloping in own prices and are increasing (decreas-
ing) functions of the price of the rival’s product if the goods are substitutes (complements).
In the following analysis, we restrict attention to the case of producers of substitute goods,
0 ≤ θ<1.13 Moreover, since the demand functions are not deﬁn e df o rt h ec a s eo fθ =1 ,w e
will not be analyzing the case of perfect substitutes.
The two ﬁrms and the antitrust authorities play the following multi-stage noncoopera-
tive game. In the ﬁrst stage, the antitrust authorities announce their policy regarding the
licensing of intellectual property. In the second stage, following the announcement of the an-
titrust authorities, the patentholder decides whether to license the technology and discloses
11We assume that there is perfect patent protection which protects the patentholder against imitation.
12See Poddar and Sinha (2004) for an analysis of the incentives to license in a diﬀerent type of product
diﬀerentiation model. They consider the Hotelling’s linear city model and assume that the market is covered.
13The analysis of licensing agreements between producers of complementary goods is left for future work.
5its licensing policy. In the third stage, the potential licensee decides whether or not to accept
the licensing oﬀer. If the antitrust authorities allow collusive licensing, the ﬁrms will always
choose collusive licensing. Finally, in the fourth stage, the two ﬁrms compete in the product
market by choosing prices.
While analyzing the game, subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is adopted as the solution
concept. We ﬁrst ﬁnd the equilibrium outcomes in the product market. Then we move on to
analyze the private incentives to license and show how the degree of diﬀerentiation between
the products of the ﬁrms may aﬀect their decision-making. Finally, we consider optimal
licensing policy, deﬁning social welfare as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus.
Thus, the antitrust authorities maximize
W = U (qi,q j) − ciqi − cjqj
where U (qi,q j) is given by (1).
III No Licensing
If the ﬁrms cannot agree on a licensing arrangement, ﬁrm i will produce with the new tech-
nology and ﬁrm j will produce with the old technology. Their proﬁt levels are
πN
i (pi,p j)=( pi − ci)qi; πN
j (pi,p j)=( pj − ci − ε)qj
where the superscript N stands for the case of no licensing, and qi and qj are given by (2)






4 − θ2¢ (3)
pN
j =
(a(1 − θ)+ci)(2+θ)+2 ε
¡
4 − θ2¢ .( 4 )
Firm j receives zero demand if the marginal cost it faces is so high that ﬁrm i can price ﬁrm
j out of the market. Firm j will never want to charge a price that is lower than its marginal
cost of production, ci +ε. Therefore, we can obtain the condition on ε such that both of the
ﬁrms are in the market in equilibrium by setting qj =0 ,s o l v i n gf o rpj, and checking when it





















4 − θ2¢2 (6)
as the proﬁt levels of the ﬁrms for small innovations.
For ε ≥ b ε, ﬁrm i is the only seller in the market. Firm j receives zero demand despite
setting a price equal to marginal cost. Firm i can charge the monopoly price if by doing
so, it can still keep ﬁrm j out of the market. Thus, for ε ≥ e ε,w h e r ee ε =( a − ci)(2− θ)/2,
ﬁrm i charges the monopoly price (a + ci)/2 and earns (a − ci)
2 /4. Since the innovator can
charge the monopoly price for ε ≥ e ε, such innovations fall under Arrow’s (1962) deﬁnition of
a drastic innovation.
For b ε ≤ ε<e ε, ﬁrm i is able to keep ﬁrm j out of the market, but it cannot charge the
monopoly price. The equilibrium prices are pN
i =[ ci + ε − a(1 − θ)]/θ and pN
j = ci + ε.
Firm j makes zero while ﬁrm i makes πN
i =( a − ci − ε)((ci − a)(1− θ)+ε)/θ2.
IV Incentives to License
iR o y a l t y L i c e n s i n g
The existence of tacit knowledge or asymmetric information regarding the value of the licensed
technology may cause the parties to prefer to have a licensing contract that speciﬁes a royalty
rate only. In this case, a ﬂat royalty payment per unit of production, r,i so ﬀered as the rate
at which the rival can purchase a license. If licensing occurs, the unit production cost of ﬁrm
i is equal to ci and the unit production cost of ﬁrm j is equal to ci+r. Thus, royalty licensing
allows the licensor to control the marginal cost of the licensee.
We start by analyzing the Bertrand equilibria in the product market, where the ﬁrms
choose prices knowing r. The proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms are
πR
i (pi,p j,r)=( pi − ci)qi + rqj; πR
j (pi,p j,r)=( pj − ci − r)qj (7)
where the superscript R stands for royalty licensing. Maximizing the proﬁt functions with
7respect to prices and solving the ﬁrst order conditions gives us the following price equilibrium:
pR
i (r)=
(a(1 − θ)+ci)(2+θ)+3 rθ
¡







4 − θ2¢ .( 9 )
In the third stage, the rival ﬁrm will not accept a licensing contract if it results in a lower
proﬁt level than its proﬁt level before licensing. Thus, in the second stage of the game, the
licensor takes this into account while deciding what royalty rate to oﬀer to its rival. After
substituting for the prices in πR
i (pi,p j,r), the licensor maximizes πR
i (r) with respect to r
subject to the constraint that πR
j (r) ≥ πN
j . We get the following result.






2) , the optimal royalty









The proof of Proposition 1 can be found in the Appendix. It indicates that for suﬃciently
small innovation sizes, ﬁrm i is constrained in its determination of the royalty rate by ﬁrm
j’s willingness to pay. As the innovation size increases, ﬁrm j loses more by not licensing.
Therefore, ﬁrm i can charge a higher royalty rate.
Proposition 1 implies that for suﬃciently small innovation sizes, the optimal royalty rate
may be larger than ε. The potential licensee may prefer licensing to no licensing even in
cases when r>ε . This is because licensing with a royalty helps ﬁrms coordinate their
pricing behavior. The increase in the prices more than compensates for the increase in the
marginal cost of production that the licensee experiences under the licensing agreement.
Given these prices, the patentholder will license the technology with a royalty if the proﬁt
with licensing is higher than the proﬁt without licensing. We can show that for 0 ≤ θ<1,
royalty licensing is always preferable to no licensing.
Proposition 2 Under royalty licensing, the innovator will always license the innovation.
Proposition 2 indicates ﬁrst that the innovator is willing to license the innovation even to
producers of close substitutes. Second, the innovator is willing to license even in cases when,
under no licensing, it is the only seller in the market. Thus, allowing entry by a rival ﬁrm
into the market and beneﬁting from its consumer base results in a higher proﬁt than being
the only supplier in the market.
8The reason behind both of these remarks is that royalty licensing allows the licensor to
exert suﬃcient control over the cost and the price of the licensee. Under royalty licensing, the
rival’s unit production cost decreases by ε due to its ability to use the new technology, but it
increases by r due to the per unit royalty it has to pay. The expressions for pR
i and pR
j above
reveal that in equilibrium, ﬁrm i charges a lower price than ﬁrm j. This means ﬁrm i is able
to price discriminate between its own customers and ﬁrm j’s customers. This prevents ﬁrm i
from losing too many customers to ﬁrm j. Therefore, with royalty licensing, ﬁrm i is able to
capture at least part of the proﬁts that ﬁrm j makes as a result of the licensing arrangement,
without causing the competition between them to become too intense.
ii Fixed Fee Licensing
If the ﬁrms prefer ﬁxed fee licensing, the licensor licenses its technology with a ﬂat lump-
sum fee, F.T h e ﬁxed fee is invariant of the quantity ﬁrm j will produce using the new
technology. In the price-setting stage, we know that if licensing takes place, both ﬁrms will
have a production cost of ci. The proﬁt functions of the ﬁrms are
πF
i (pi,p j)=( pi − ci)qi + F; πF
j (pi,p j)=( pj − ci)qj − F
where the superscript F denotes ﬁxed fee licensing.
Maximizing these functions, we get pF
i = pF




i (r) and pR
j (r) above, we can see that as long as the royalty rate is strictly
positive, the ﬁrms always end up with higher prices under royalty licensing. Thus, royalty
licensing helps ﬁrms coordinate their pricing behavior.
In the third stage of the game, ﬁrm j accepts the licensing deal if and only if πF
j ≥ πN
j .
Thus, the maximum fee that ﬁrm i can charge ﬁrm j i st h ea m o u n tt h a tw i l lm a k eﬁrm j
just indiﬀerent between licensing and no licensing. Since ﬁrm i’s proﬁt level is increasing in













for ε<b ε.F o r ε ≥ b ε, ﬁrm i can charge a fee such that ﬁrm j is just indiﬀerent between




2 (1 − θ)
(1 + θ)(2− θ)
2 .
9Given these fee amounts, we can analyze ﬁrm i’s incentives to license under ﬁxed fee
licensing.
Proposition 3 Consider the case of ﬁxed fee licensing. For 0 ≤ ε<b ε,t h ei n n o v a t o rw i l l
license the innovation iﬀ ε ≤ εFN1 (a,ci,θ).F o r b ε ≤ ε<e ε, the innovator will license the
innovation iﬀ ε ≤ εFN2 (a,ci,θ).F o r ε ≥ e ε, the innovator will license the innovation iﬀ
θ ≤ 0.61.
The exact expressions for the critical ε values, which are functions of a, ci,a n dθ,c a nb e
found in the Appendix. Figure 1 illustrates the results. (Figure 1 also shows the region where
it is socially desirable to allow collusive licensing (C) deals which we shall discuss below.)
The solid line in Figure 1 represents the boundary between ﬁxed fee licensing (F) and no
licensing (N). The dotted lines outline the regions where 0 ≤ ε<ε r, εr ≤ ε<b ε, b ε ≤ ε<e ε,
and ε ≥ e ε. In contrast with the case of royalty licensing, ﬁxed fee licensing will not occur if
the products are suﬃciently close substitutes and the innovation is suﬃciently large. When
the licensor cannot use the royalty rate to discriminate between its own price and the rival’s
price, it does not ﬁnd it proﬁtable to license its technology if the products are close substitutes
due to the increased competition it will face. Figure 1 illustrates that since εFN1 (a,ci,θ)
and εFN2 (a,ci,θ) are decreasing functions of θ, the range of innovations that are proﬁtable
to license increases as the degree of product diﬀerentiation increases. The licensor ﬁnds it
optimal to license larger and larger innovations. These results imply that we should expect
to see ﬁxed fee licensing occurring between producers of suﬃciently diﬀerentiated goods.
iii Two-part Tariﬀ Licensing
Consider next the two-part tariﬀ that includes r, the per-unit royalty that is paid according
to the number of units that are sold, and F, the lump-sum payment that is paid up front
when the licensing agreement is made. We assume the ﬁxed fee cannot be negative.14 The
licensing revenues of the licensor can be expressed as rqj +F.I nt h eﬁnal stage of the game,










j (pi,p j,r) − F =( pj − ci − r)qj − F
14This assumption allows us to restrict the set of collusive outcomes that can be achieved by using two-part
tariﬀ licensing. As pointed out in Shapiro (1985), if negative ﬁxed fees are allowed, the licensor can charge a
large royalty rate and then compensate the licensee with a side payment.
10Figure 1: Incentives for Fixed Fee Licensing
where the superscript TPT stands for two-part tariﬀ licensing. Since the ﬁrms regard the
ﬁxed fee F as a constant while they are choosing prices in the last stage, solving these
maximization problems with respect to the respective prices results in the same prices as in
(8) and (9).
In the third stage of the game, for the licensee to accept the licensing oﬀer of the licensor,
it is necessary that the proﬁts under licensing are not lower than the proﬁts under no licensing.
Therefore, the licensor sets the lump-sum fee, FTPT, such that the licensee is just indiﬀerent
between licensing and not licensing given the value of r: πTPT
j (r,F)−πN
j =0 . This gives us
FTPT = πR
j (r) − πN




j (r) − πN
j such that F ≥ 0.
The objective function of the licensor is a concave quadratic function of r.T h u s ,s o l v i n g
the ﬁrst-order condition gives us the following royalty rate:
rTPT =





11For ε<b ε, the lump-sum fee value that this royalty rate yields is equal to
FTPT =
(a − ci)












4 − θ2¢2 .( 1 0 )
For ε ≥ b ε,w eh a v eFTPT = πR
j (r) since πN
j =0 .
We need to check whether the optimal ﬁxed fee amounts stated above are non-negative.
We get the following result.
















Proposition 4 indicates that for suﬃciently small innovations, i.e., for ε<ε tpt,t h e r ew i l l
n o tb ea n yt w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀ licensing. Assuming there cannot be any side payments from the
licensor to the licensee, the optimal licensing contract consists of a royalty rate only. For
larger innovation sizes, the optimal licensing contract speciﬁes both a royalty rate and a ﬁxed
fee to be paid by the licensee.
Remark 1 As θ → 0, rTPT → 0.
Looking at rTPT, we can see that it is an increasing function of θ. When the ﬁrms make
at w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀ licensing deal, as the degree of diﬀerentiation increases (i.e., as θ → 0), the
royalty rate gets smaller and smaller. In the limit, when θ =0 , the licensor charges a ﬁxed fee
only. As the competition between the ﬁrms decrease, the licensor prefers to keep the royalty
charged as small as possible in order not to aﬀect the licensing revenues collected adversely.
Thus, for high levels of product diﬀerentiation, the licensor mimics the behavior of a social
planner.
This equilibrium outcome gives one explanation for the low royalty rates that are observed
in the real world.15 A nice empirical implication of this result is to check whether there is
a direct relationship between the magnitudes of the royalty rates speciﬁed in the licensing
contracts and the degree of diﬀerentiation that exists between the products of the ﬁrms
signing the contract.
Finally, the following result follows directly from Proposition 2.
15Rockett (1990a) and Rostoker (1984) provide evidence for the existence of very low levels of royalties in
some industries.
12Proposition 5 Under two-part tariﬀ licensing, the innovator will always license the inno-
vation.
Since royalty licensing can be viewed as a constrained version of two-part tariﬀ licensing,
it is clear that the licensor will prefer two-part tariﬀ licensing to no licensing anytime it
prefers royalty licensing to no licensing.
iv Collusive Licensing
If the antitrust authorities allow collusive licensing, the ﬁrms will always prefer collusive
licensing to the other types of licensing available to them. Collusion may be achieved through
various provisions in the licensing agreement. Assume that the licensing contract speciﬁes
the prices to be charged by the two parties. Since the ﬁrms will be jointly maximizing their
proﬁt levels, the prices and proﬁts are pC
i =( a + ci)/2 and πC
i = πC
j =( a − ci)
2 /[4(1 + θ)].
V Optimal Licensing Policy
Although licensing arrangements allow more ﬁrms to beneﬁt from the superior technology
of the patentholder, it is important to see how the distortions caused by the licensing deals
may aﬀect social welfare. In the following analysis, we determine the range of innovations
that is socially optimal to transfer. We assume the antitrust authorities aim to maximize
social welfare through the restrictions they impose on the licensing practices of ﬁrms. That
is, the government can pursue a hypothetical policy through which they can tell ﬁrms when
they are not allowed to pursue a speciﬁc type of licensing. However, the government cannot
impose a speciﬁc licensing method that the ﬁrms should use in order to do the technology
transfer. Given the guidelines provided by the government, the ﬁrms are free to choose the
type of licensing method they prefer.
Speciﬁcally, the analysis of optimal licensing policy focuses on the following three ques-
tions. First, we ask whether there are regions of the parameter space where royalty, ﬁxed fee
or two-part tariﬀ licensing is welfare-reducing. We assume the government disallows the use
of a certain type of licensing if that type of licensing results in a lower welfare level than no
licensing. Second, we ask whether in cases when royalty, ﬁxed fee or two-part tariﬀ licensing
is welfare-reducing, it may be welfare-improving to allow collusive licensing. Third, we ask
whether, even in cases when royalty, ﬁxed fee or two-part tariﬀ licensing is welfare-improving,
it may be desirable to have collusive licensing instead. We assume that the government allows
13the ﬁrms to use collusive licensing if doing so results in a higher welfare level than the other
types of licensing and no licensing.
We start by considering industries where the licensing agreements include a royalty rate.
iL i c e n s i n g w i t h a r o y a l t y
The following two results regarding royalty and two-part tariﬀ licensing reveal that, if the
licensing contract includes a royalty payment, the social beneﬁt of having lower production
costs may not always outweigh the social cost of having lower output choices. Lemma 2 is
in line with the result in Fauli-Oller and Sandonis (2002) while Lemma 1 is an extension of
their result to the case of royalty licensing.
Lemma 1 For 0 ≤ ε<ε r, royalty licensing results in a higher welfare level than no licensing
iﬀ ε ≤ εRN1 (a,ci,θ).F o rεr ≤ ε<b ε, royalty licensing results in a higher welfare level than
no licensing iﬀ εRN2 (a,ci,θ) ≤ ε ≤ εRN3 (a,ci,θ).F o r b ε ≤ ε<e ε, royalty licensing results
in a higher welfare level than no licensing iﬀ ε ≥ εRN4 (a,ci,θ).F o rε ≥ e ε,r o y a l t yl i c e n s i n g
always results in a higher welfare level than no licensing.
Lemma 2 For 0 ≤ ε<ε tpt, welfare under two-part tariﬀ licensing is always higher than
welfare under no licensing. For εtpt ≤ ε<b ε,t w o - p a r tt a r i ﬀ licensing results in a higher
welfare level than no licensing iﬀ εTPTN1 (a,ci,θ) ≤ ε ≤ εTPTN2 (a,ci,θ).F o rb ε ≤ ε<e ε,t w o -
part tariﬀ licensing results in a higher welfare level than no licensing iﬀ ε ≥ εTPTN3 (a,ci,θ).
For ε ≥ e ε, two-part tariﬀ licensing always results in a higher welfare level than no licensing.
Figure 2 shows the regions stated in Lemmas 1 and 2. The solid line shows where royalty
licensing (R) will be preferred to no licensing and the long dashed line shows where two-part
tariﬀ licensing (TPT) will be preferred to no licensing. We see that if the ﬁrms do royalty
or two-part tariﬀ licensing, social welfare may be reduced in case of intermediate innovation
sizes if the products of the ﬁrms are suﬃciently close substitutes.16 When the innovation
is suﬃciently small, the royalty rate charged is also small and, hence, does not aﬀect social
welfare adversely. On the other hand, when the innovation is suﬃciently large, the social
beneﬁto fh a v i n gb o t hﬁrms use the innovation outweighs the social cost of having higher
prices due to the use of royalties. Thus, in case of drastic innovations (for ε ≥ e ε), we always
have WR >WN and WTPT >WN.
16It has been common to assume in the licensing literature that r ≤ ε since r c a nb eu s e db yt h eﬁrms to
facilitate collusion. Our analysis indicates that this is too restrictive a policy for the antitrust authorities to
m a k es i n c ew es h o wt h a te v e ni nc a s e sw h e nr>ε , social welfare may improve as a result of licensing.
14Figure 2: Welfare Implications of Licensing with a Royalty
Figure 2 also reveals that the set of parameters where two-part tariﬀ licensing is socially
preferable to no licensing is larger than the set of parameters where royalty licensing is socially
preferable to no licensing. This is because when the licensing contract includes both a royalty
rate and a ﬁxed fee, the licensor ﬁnds it optimal to charge a lower royalty rate, which results
in lower distortion.
We next compare welfare under royalty licensing and welfare under two-part tariﬀ li-
censing with welfare under collusive licensing to see whether there are cases when collusive
licensing performs better.
Lemma 3 Welfare under royalty licensing is higher than welfare under collusive licensing iﬀ
the innovation is suﬃciently small, i.e., iﬀ ε ≤ εRC <ε r.
Lemma 4 Welfare under two-part tariﬀ licensing is always higher than welfare under collu-
sive licensing.
While welfare under two-part tariﬀ licensing is always higher than welfare under collusive
licensing, welfare under royalty licensing is rarely higher than welfare under collusive licensing.
Royalties allow the licensor to indirectly control the behavior of the licensee while under
15collusive licensing both ﬁrms have a direct control over each other’s behavior. Lemmas 3 and
4 imply that allowing the ﬁrms to have such a direct control over each other’s behavior may
be desirable in case of royalty licensing only. This is because the distortion caused by the
royalty rate charged under royalty licensing is higher. The desirability of collusive licensing
depends on how large the innovation is. Lemma 3 indicates that since εRC <ε r < b ε,i tm a y
be desirable to allow the ﬁrms to use collusive licensing instead of royalty licensing not only
in regions where there is only one ﬁrm in the market, but also in regions where both ﬁrms
are in the market.
Although it may be optimal to have collusive licensing instead of royalty licensing in
many cases, we still need to check when it is optimal to have collusive licensing instead of no
licensing in order to determine optimal licensing policy.
Lemma 5 For 0 ≤ ε<b ε, collusive licensing results in a higher welfare level than no licensing
iﬀ εCN1 (a,ci,θ) ≤ ε ≤ εCN2 (a,ci,θ).F o r b ε ≤ ε<e ε, collusive licensing results in a higher
welfare level than no licensing iﬀ ε ≥ εCN3 (a,ci,θ).F o r ε ≥ e ε, collusive licensing always
results in a higher welfare level than no licensing.
The graphical representation of the critical ε values stated in Lemma 5 looks similar to
the graph for Lemma 2. For ε<e ε, allowing collusion in the licensing stage may harm social
welfare if and only if the products are close substitutes and the innovation size is suﬃciently
small. Allowing ﬁrms to collude and produce at a lower cost in cases when the ﬁrms are
not competing intensely does not hurt social welfare. For ε ≥ e ε, having collusive licensing is
always preferable to having no licensing at all. If the innovation is a drastic one or close to
a drastic one, it is better to have two ﬁrms and high prices than to have one ﬁrm and high
prices due to the larger output we would have with two ﬁrms operating in the market.
We can ﬁnally combine our results to state what the optimal licensing policy is. Note
that the government always ﬁnds it optimal to allow technology transfers where the licensee
pays a ﬁxed fee to the licensor.
Lemma 6 Welfare under ﬁxed fee licensing is always higher than welfare under no licensing
and welfare under collusive licensing.
Since ﬁxed fee licensing achieves the diﬀusion of the innovator’s superior technology with-
out causing any distortions in the output choice of the licensee, total industry output always
16Figure 3: Policy under Royalty Licensing
increases. Thus, even if the government ﬁnds it optimal to restrict royalty, two-part tariﬀ or
collusive licensing, it will always allow ﬁxed fee licensing.
We ﬁrst consider industries where, due to the existence of tacit knowledge and asymmetric
information, the ﬁrms prefer to do royalty licensing only. Proposition 6 states what the
optimal licensing policy is.
Proposition 6 If royalty licensing is the preferred method of licensing by the ﬁrms, it is
socially optimal to have royalty licensing only in cases when the innovation size is very small.
For intermediate innovation sizes and low degrees of diﬀerentiation, it is optimal to allow
the ﬁrms to do ﬁxed fee licensing only. For suﬃciently large innovations and high degrees of
diﬀerentiation, it is socially optimal to allow collusive licensing.
Figure 3 illustrates the types of technology transfer deals that will take place under the
optimal licensing policy stated in Proposition 6. In case of royalty licensing, it is optimal to
allow collusive licensing for a large portion of the parameter space as long as the innovation is
suﬃciently large and the products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated. Whenever the government
allows collusive licensing deals, the ﬁrms will prefer it over the other methods of technology
transfer since it yields the highest proﬁts. Figure 3 furthermore illustrates that some licens-
17Figure 4: Policy under Two-part Tariﬀ Licensing
ing deals that are welfare improving under collusive licensing will not be socially desirable
under royalty licensing. That is, for ε>ε RN1 (a,ci,θ), the region where royalty licensing is
welfare reducing (which falls to the right of εRN1 (a,ci,θ), εRN2 (a,ci,θ), εRN3 (a,ci,θ) and
εRN4 (a,ci,θ)) is larger than the region where collusive licensing is welfare reducing (which
falls to the right of εCN1 (a,ci,θ), εCN2 (a,ci,θ),a n dεCN3 (a,ci,θ)). This is because the
distortion caused by royalty licensing is larger than the distortion caused by collusive licens-
ing. Thus, under collusive licensing it is desirable to restrict the transfer of a smaller set of
innovations.
Proposition 6 also states that in cases where the products are close substitutes, if the
innovation size is relatively small, it is optimal to allow the ﬁrms to do ﬁxed fee licensing
only. However, since the ﬁrms do not have any incentives to do ﬁxed fee licensing, there will
not be any technology transfers in this region.
Next, consider the case of two-part tariﬀ licensing.
Proposition 7 If the ﬁrms prefer to make a two-part tariﬀ licensing agreement, collusive
agreements should never be allowed. In case of intermediate innovations and close substitutes,
it is socially optimal to have ﬁxed fee licensing only.
18We know from Lemma 2 that two-part tariﬀ licensing is welfare reducing when the inno-
vation size is suﬃciently small and the products are relatively close substitutes. In such cases,
it is socially desirable to allow the ﬁrms to do ﬁxed fee licensing only since welfare under
ﬁxed fee licensing is always higher than welfare under no licensing. As shown in Figure 4, the
ﬁrms will do ﬁxed fee licensing in this region if the products are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated.
We next consider optimal licensing policy in industries with low imitation or high moni-
toring costs, where the ﬁrms choose to do ﬁxed fee licensing only.
ii Licensing without a royalty
Fixed fee licensing is always socially preferable to no licensing or collusive licensing. However,
we know from Proposition 3 that the ﬁr m sd on o th a v ei n c e n t i v e st om a k eﬁxed fee licensing
deals for low levels of product diﬀerentiation and suﬃciently large innovations. In such cases,
it may be socially desirable to allow collusive licensing deals if doing so results in a higher
welfare level than having no technology transfers. The following proposition deﬁnes the
optimal licensing policy.
Proposition 8 If ﬁxed fee licensing is the preferred method of licensing by the ﬁrms, it is
socially optimal to allow collusive licensing for suﬃciently high innovation sizes and low
degrees of diﬀerentiation.
Figure 1 illustrates the optimal outcome for society under ﬁxed fee licensing, taking into
account the private incentives of ﬁrms. The long dashed line in Figure 1 indicates that in cases
when the ﬁrms do not have incentives to do ﬁxed fee licensing, allowing collusive licensing may
increase social welfare if the innovation size is suﬃciently large. That is, collusive licensing
should be tolerated mainly in cases where the degree of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently
low and the non-innovating ﬁrm would not be able to enter the market without collusive
licensing. This is because in such cases it is better to have two ﬁrms charging high prices
than one ﬁrm charging a high price in the market.
The results on optimal licensing policy can be summarized in the following way. For
suﬃciently small innovations and low degrees of product diﬀerentiation, it is socially optimal
to have ﬁxed fee licensing only. In this region, the ﬁrms do not ﬁnd it privately proﬁtable
to have ﬁxed fee licensing deals if the innovation is suﬃciently large and the products are
suﬃciently close substitutes. Thus, we can see in Figures 1, 3 and 4 that under optimal
licensing policy, if the degree of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low, innovations that
19are suﬃciently small will not be licensed. Figures 1, 3 and 4 also indicate that the government
should have the least restrictive licensing policy in industries where ﬁrms use two-part tariﬀ
licensing. That is, the set of innovations that are socially optimal to transfer is the largest
under two-part tariﬀ licensing. In all of the ﬁgures, the range of innovation sizes that is
socially optimal to transfer decreases as the degree of product diﬀerentiation decreases. In
the limit, as the degree of product diﬀerentiation converges to zero, it is socially desirable
to transfer drastic innovations only. In industries where the ﬁrms prefer to do ﬁxed fee or
royalty licensing only, it may be socially desirable to encourage such transfers by allowing
collusive licensing deals.
VI Conclusion
The antitrust implications of licensing arrangements have been the subject of policy debates
in diﬀerent countries including the United States and Australia. We have analyzed optimal
licensing policy in industries where imitation is highly probable and ﬁrms prefer to have
ﬁxed-fee licensing only, in industries where technology transfer deals are characterized by
asymmetric information and ﬁrms prefer to have royalty licensing only, and in industries
where the ﬁrms do two-part tariﬀ licensing. We have explored when ﬁrms should be allowed
to include royalties and when they should be allowed to ﬁx prices in the licensing contracts.
Our results imply that licensing policy geared towards industries where products tend
to be more homogeneous should be diﬀerent from licensing policy geared towards industries
where products tend to be more diﬀerentiated. Moreover, the antitrust authorities should
treat technology transfer deals that take place between actual competitors diﬀerently from
technology transfer deals that take place between potential competitors.
Speciﬁcally, the results show that it is too restrictive a policy guideline to regard all
collusive licensing deals as anticompetitive since collusive licensing may result in a higher
welfare level than royalty licensing and no licensing. The results imply that the antitrust
authorities need to be less concerned about collusive licensing deals that take place between
potential (as opposed to actual) competitors. In fact, we ﬁnd that if the innovation is drastic,
it is always socially desirable to encourage its transfer. On the other hand, if the innovation
size is suﬃciently small and the degree of product diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low, it is not
socially desirable to have any technology transfers. Thus, the antitrust authorities should
have the most restrictive licensing policy in case of technology transfers that take place
between actual competitors in industries where products tend to be more homogeneous.
20This is because licensing deals between producers of close substitutes that involve suﬃciently
small (nondrastic) innovations are socially desirable if and only if the ﬁrms use ﬁxed fee
licensing. However, the ﬁrms do not ﬁnd it optimal to use ﬁxed fee licensing for suﬃciently
high innovation sizes and low degrees of diﬀerentiation. In the limit, as the degree of product
diﬀerentiation converges to zero, it is socially desirable to transfer drastic innovations only.
The range of innovation sizes that is socially optimal to transfer increases as the degree of
product diﬀerentiation increases.
There are a number of ways in which the paper can be extended. First, the policy
implications of licensing arrangements between producers of complementary goods can be
analyzed. Second, optimal licensing policy can be analyzed by considering the eﬀects of
licensing on pre-licensing or post-licensing R&D incentives. Third, the assumptions made
regarding the market structure can be relaxed by allowing for a higher number of ﬁrms or
entry. The eﬀects of having multiple potential licensors or multiple potential licensees on
the licensing behavior of ﬁrms can be analyzed. Finally, since licensing contracts sometimes
include non-linear royalties, the impact of non-linear royalties on optimal licensing policy can
be explored.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
In case of royalty licensing, the licensor maximizes πR
i (r) with respect to r subject to the
constraint that πR
j (r) − πN
j ≥ 0. The unconstrained maximization of πR









The licensor will choose rU if it satisﬁes the incentive compatibility constraint of the licensee.
It is straightforward to check that the incentive compatibility constraint of the licensee is
satisﬁed for ε ≥ b ε.F o rε<b ε, plugging rU into the expression for πR
j (r) − πN
j yields:
πR
j (r) − πN
j =
£







(a − ci)(1− θ)(2+θ) − ε
¡
2 − θ2¢¤2 .
This expression, which is in the form of a2−b2, can be factored into (a + b)(a − b).N o t et h a t
since we are interested in ε<b ε =
(a−ci)(1−θ)(2+θ)
(2−θ
2) , b>0. Therefore, the sign of πR
j (r) − πN
j
is the same as the sign of (a − b).S o l v i n g(a − b)=0for ε gives us:
εr =
(a − ci)(1− θ)(2+θ)
¡




Since (a − b) is an increasing function of ε, we know that πR
j (r) − πN
j ≥ 0 for all ε ≥ εr.
Comparing b ε with εr, we can easily show that εr < b ε for 0 ≤ θ<1. Therefore, the licensor
cannot charge rU for ε<ε r < b ε.
There are two values of r that satisfy πR
j (r) − πN
j =0 .T h e ya r e :
rC1 =












The licensor will choose the one that yields a higher proﬁt level. Evaluating πR
i (r) at rC1
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which is a concave quadratic function of ε. Setting πR
i − πN







4) .S i n c eεr <ε 2 for 0 ≤ θ<1,w eh a v eπR
i ≥ πN
i for 0 ≤ ε<ε r.
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To show that πR
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2 < 0. Therefore, if πR
i − πN
i ≥ 0 for the largest value of ε we are
interested in, it is nonnegative everywhere. Plugging in b ε for ε and checking the sign of
πR
i − πN
i for 0 ≤ θ<1 gives us the result.
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(a − ci − ε)[(a − ci)(1− θ) − ε]
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Again, to show that πR
i −πN













i ≥ 0 for the largest value of ε we are interested in, it is nonnegative everywhere.
Plugging in e ε for ε and checking the sign of πR
i − πN
i for 0 ≤ θ<1 gives us the result.









which is positive for 0 ≤ θ<1.
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4) .S i n c e ε2 = εFN1 < b ε for high values of θ, ﬁrm i will prefer ﬁxed fee
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i is a convex quadratic function of ε.I t h a s t w o r o o t s ,ε1 and ε2.F i r m























2(1+θ)(2−θ) . However, since we are interested in b ε ≤ ε<e ε,
we need to make sure that both of the roots fall within that region. Graphing b ε, e ε, ε1,a n d
ε2 against θ shows that e ε<ε 2 for 0 ≤ θ<1. Therefore, ﬁrm i will prefer ﬁxed fee licensing
as long as ε ≤ εFN2 = ε1.




i =( a − ci)
2
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Numerical estimation shows that πF
i − πN
i ≥ 0 for θ ≤ 0.61.
D Proof of Proposition 4
The licensor will set
rTPT =





24as long as doing so gives F ≥ 0.F o rε ≥ b ε, F = πR
j (r) > 0.F o rε<b ε, plugging rTPT into
the expression for πR
j (r) − πN
j and solving for the critical ε value as we did in the proof of










Thus, F = πR
j (r) − πN
j ≥ 0 for all ε ≥ εtpt. Comparing εtpt with εr, we can easily show that
εtpt <ε r for 0 ≤ θ<1.
For ε<ε tpt, the licensor will set the royalty rate such that πR
j (r)−πN
j =0 .T h i sr o y a l t y




2) as we showed in the proof of Proposition 1.
E Proof of Proposition 5
The result follows from Proposition 2. Since πTPT
i ≥ πR
i , ﬁrm i should prefer two-part tariﬀ
licensing to no licensing whenever it prefers royalty licensing to no licensing.
F Proof of Lemma 1
For 0 ≤ ε<ε r,w eh a v e :
WR − WN =
ε
h
4(a − ci)(1− θ)
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2) .S i n c eε2 = εRN1 <ε r for some θ values, royalty licensing results in a




For εr ≤ ε<b ε,
WR − WN =
(a − ci)
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where B =( 1 − θ)(2+θ)
2 (3 − 2θ). This is a concave quadratic function of ε. Setting











4) ,w h e r eC =
−1344 + 1728θ + 992θ2 − 208θ3 +1 2 θ4 − 160θ5 − 133θ6 − 57θ7 − 22θ8 +2 θ9.L e tεRN2 and
εRN3 represent the two roots. Graphical comparison of the various ε values reveals that









For b ε ≤ ε<e ε,w eh a v e :
WR − WN =
(a − ci)
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(a − ci − ε)[(a − ci)(1− 2θ) − ε]
2θ2














2) .L e tε1 and ε2 stand for the two roots.















Therefore, collusive licensing results in a higher welfare level than no licensing for ε ≥ εRN4 =
ε2.
For ε ≥ e ε,w eh a v e :
WR − WN =
(a − ci)
2 (1 − θ)
¡




which is positive for θ ∈ [0,1).
G Proof of Lemma 2
For 0 ≤ ε<ε tpt,
WTPT − WN =
ε
h
4(a − ci)(1− θ)





1 − θ2¢2 .





2) .S i n c eεtpt <ε 2 for all θ values, two-part tariﬀ licensing always results
in a higher welfare level than no licensing.
For εtpt ≤ ε<b ε,
WTPT − WN =
(a − ci)
2 ¡
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6 .L e tεTPTN1
and εTPTN2 represent the two roots. Graphical analysis reveals that two-part tariﬀ licensing





For b ε ≤ ε<e ε,w eh a v e :
WTPT − WN =
(a − ci)
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2) .L e tε1 and ε2 stand for the two roots.













2) < b ε.T h e r e -
fore, collusive licensing results in a higher welfare level than no licensing for ε ≥ ε2 = εTPTN3.
For ε ≥ e ε,w eh a v e :
WTPT − WN =
(a − ci)
2 ¡




which is positive for θ ∈ [0,1).
H Proof of Lemma 3
For 0 ≤ ε<ε r,w eh a v e :
WR − WC =
2(a − ci)








4 − 5θ2 + θ4¢2
where E =( 1+θ)(1− θ)
2 (2 + θ)
















2) . Since the positive root is less
than εr, welfare under royalty licensing is greater than welfare under collusive licensing for
















For ε ≥ εr,w eh a v e :
WR − WC = −
(a − ci)
2 ¡




which is less than zero for θ ∈ [0,1).
27I Proof of Lemma 4
For 0 ≤ ε<ε tpt,t h ev a l u ef o rWTPT − WC is equal to the value for WR − WC in
















2) . Since the positive root is greater than
εtpt, welfare under two-part tariﬀ licensing is greater than welfare under collusive licensing
for ε ≤ εtpt.
For ε ≥ εtpt, WTPT and WC are both independent of the magnitude of ε.W eh a v e :
WTPT − WC =
(a − ci)




which proves to be nonnegative for θ ∈ [0,1).
J Proof of Lemma 5
For 0 ≤ ε<b ε,w eh a v e :
WC − WN = −
(a − ci)
2 Dθ(4 − 3θ) − 4(a − ci)εD(3 − 2θ)+2 ε2 ¡





where D =( 1− θ)(2+θ)














4 .L e t εCN1 and εCN2
represent the two roots. Graphical analysis reveals that collusive licensing results in a higher
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Let ε1 and ε2 stand for the two roots. Graphical comparison of the various ε values reveals









2(1+θ) . Therefore, collusive licensing results in a higher
welfare level than no licensing for ε ≥ ε2 = εCN3.
For ε ≥ e ε,w eh a v e :
WC − WN =
3(a − ci)
2 (1 − θ)
8(1+θ)
which is positive for θ ∈ [0,1).
28K Proof of Lemma 6
Consider ﬁrst WF and WN.F o r0 ≤ ε<b ε,w eh a v e :
WF − WN =
ε
h
2(a − ci)(1− θ)(2+θ)
2 (3 − 2θ) − ε
¡












(2 + θ)(3− 2θ) < 2(a − ci)(1− θ)(2+θ)
2 (3 − 2θ).S i n c e ε
¡
12 − 9θ2 +2 θ4¢
is smaller than the left hand side of this expression, we observe that the term inside the
brackets in the expression for WF − WN is positive.
For b ε ≤ ε<e ε,w eh a v e :
WF − WN =
(a − ci)
2 (3 − 2θ)
(1 + θ)(2− θ)
2 +
(a − ci − ε)[(a − ci)(1− 2θ) − ε]
2θ2
Taking the derivative with respect to ε yields
ε−(a−ci)(1−θ)
θ
2 ,w h i c hi sa l w a y sp o s i t i v ef o r
b ε ≤ ε<e ε. Evaluating WF −WN at the lower bound of this interval shows that it is positive
for ε = b ε. Therefore, WF − WN is always positive in this interval.
For ε ≥ e ε,w eh a v e :
WF − WN =
(a − ci)
2 ¡
12 − 16θ +9 θ2 − 3θ3¢
8(1+θ)(2− θ)
2
This expression is positive for θ ∈ [0,1).
In order to compare WF and WC note that
WF − WC =
(a − ci)
2 θ(4 − 3θ)
4(1+θ)(2− θ)
2 .
This expression does not depend on ε and is nonnegative for θ ∈ [0,1).
L Proof of Proposition 6
From Lemma 3, we know that WR ≥ WC i fa n do n l yi fε ≤ εRC.T h e r e f o r e ,f o r ε>ε RC,
the government should decide when to allow collusive licensing. Combining Proposition 2,
Lemma 1, Lemma 5, and Lemma 3 gives us the exact areas where collusive licensing should
be allowed and where royalty licensing should not be allowed. Speciﬁcally, we have:
29(i) For 0 ≤ ε<ε r, the government should allow royalty licensing iﬀ ε ≤ εRC and ε ≤ εRN1.
The government should allow collusive licensing iﬀ ε>ε RC and ε ≥ εCN1.
(ii) For εr ≤ ε<b ε, the government should allow collusive licensing iﬀ εCN1 ≤ ε ≤ εCN2.
(iii) For b ε ≤ ε<e ε, the government should allow collusive licensing iﬀ ε ≥ εCN3.
(iv) For ε ≥ e ε, the government should always allow collusive licensing.
M Proof of Proposition 7
From Lemma 4, we know that WTPT ≥ WC always holds. The main question is, given that
WTPT ≥ WN does not always hold, whether the government should restrict the ﬁrms to do
ﬁxed fee or royalty licensing only in cases when WTPT <WN. From Figure 3 we can see that
WTPT <W N implies WR <W N. Therefore, since it is always the case that WF ≥ WN,i t
is socially desirable to have ﬁxed fee licensing when WTPT <W N. In this region, whether
there will be any technology transfers or not depends on the ﬁrms’ incentives, which are given
in Proposition 3.
Combining Proposition 3, Proposition 5, Lemma 6, Lemma 2, Lemma 5, and Lemma 4
reveals the exact areas where two-part tariﬀ licensing should not be allowed and where there
will be no technology transfers:
(i) For 0 ≤ ε<ε tpt, the government should always allow two-part tariﬀ licensing.
(ii) For εtpt ≤ ε<b ε, the government should allow two-part tariﬀ licensing iﬀ εTPTN1 ≤ ε ≤
εTPTN2. The government should allow the ﬁrms to do ﬁxed fee licensing only iﬀ ε<ε TPTN1
and ε>ε TPTN2. We know from Proposition 3 that the ﬁrms will choose to do ﬁxed fee
licensing in that region iﬀ ε ≤ εFN1.
(iii) For b ε ≤ ε<e ε, the government should not allow two-part tariﬀ licensing iﬀ ε<
εTPTN3. Since royalty licensing will not be allowed in the same region either, the ﬁrms have
the option of doing ﬁxed fee licensing only. However, given Proposition 3, they will choose
not to have any technology transfers.
(iv) For ε ≥ e ε, the government should always allow two-part tariﬀ licensing.
N Proof of Proposition 8
From Lemma 6, we know that WF ≥ WN and WF ≥ WC always hold. The question is
whether the government should allow collusive licensing in cases when the ﬁrms will not do
any ﬁxed fee licensing. Combining Proposition 3 and Lemma 5 gives us the exact areas
30where collusive licensing should be allowed and where there will be no technology transfers.
Speciﬁcally, we have:
(i) For 0 ≤ ε<b ε,t h eﬁrms choose not to do any ﬁxed fee licensing iﬀ ε>ε FN1.T h e
government should allow collusive licensing iﬀ ε>ε FN1 and ε ≤ εCN2.
(ii) For b ε ≤ ε<e ε,t h eﬁrms choose not to do any ﬁxed fee licensing iﬀ ε>ε FN2.T h e
government should allow collusive licensing iﬀ ε>ε FN2 and ε ≥ εCN3.
(iii) For ε ≥ e ε,t h eﬁrms choose to do any ﬁxed fee licensing iﬀ θ ≤ 0.61. The government
should allow collusive licensing iﬀ θ>0.61.
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